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Abstract. This paper examines a voter model for the US which is interconnected 
with the partisan theory. In our model, voters are rational and forward-looking. 
They are perfectly informed about he preferences of political parties and about he 
state of the economy. The predictions of our voter model differ from the predictions 
of conventional voter models, according to which the incumbent benefits from low 
unemployment and low inflation, irrespective of its political colour. In a partisan 
setting, the democratic party benefits from high unemployment and the republican 
party benefits from high inflation. Regressions of presidential approval rates 
indicate that the predictions of both the partisan voter model and the conventional 
model are consistent with the data. 
1. Introduction 
Numerous tudieS indicate that macroeconomics and politics are interrelated. In
the political iterature, the retrospective oter model has acquired a stable position. 
In this model, voters evaluate political parties on the basis of their past perfor- 
mances. The basic idea behind this model is that voters reward the incumbent party 
in good times and punish it in bad times. Considerable evidence xists that Shows 
that incumbent parties benefit from favourable macroeconomic conditions, uch as 
low unemployment and low inflation (Kramer 1971; Fair 1978; Frey and Schneider 
1978; Fiorina, 1981). 
As to politics in macroeconomic models, two strands of research can be 
distinguished. The first originated with Nordhaus (1975), who suggested that 
administrations generate cycles in economic variables, called political business 
cycles, in order to increase their chances of reelection. Political business cycle 
models and retrospective voter models are closely interconnected. Given that 
voters are retrospective and that administrations aim at reelection, administrations 
will try to accomplish favourable conomic onditions immediately before elec- 
tions. Nowadays, political business cycle models as developed by Nordhaus are 
generally viewed with scepticism. Doubts have risen about the ability of policy 
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makers to generate cycles in real variables, such as unemployment. Moreover, 
little evidence xists that supports the predictions of the Nordhaus model (see 
McCallum 1978). 
The second strand of research started with Hibbs (1977), who showed that 
unemployment tended to decline during democratic administrations and tended 
to rise during republican administrations. These findings uggested the existence 
of polarised preferences. Like Nordhaus' model, Hibbs' model was based on an 
exploitable Phillips curve. However, Alesina and Sachs (1988) showed that 
polarised preferences may still give rise to partisan cycles in models with rational 
expectations, due to electoral surprises. The predictions of this rational partisan 
model differs from the Hibbs model in that real partisan effects are concentrated 
in the first part of each administration's term. There exists considerable evidence 
in favour of the (rational) partisan theory. Alesina (1987), Beck (1982), Chappell 
and Keech (1988) and Swank (1992) confirm Hibbs' findings that unemployment 
rates are lower under democratic administrations than under epublican adminis- 
trations. 
In conventional retrospective voter models, partisan behaviour of political 
parties is often ignored. Against the background of the existing evidence for 
partisan cycles in economic variables, this should be regarded as a principal 
shortcoming of these models. In a partisan framework, elections have important 
economic consequences. Rational voters will take these ffects into consideration in 
making their vote decisions. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the key 
idea behind the retrospective oter models that the incumbent party benefits from 
favourable conomic outcomes is false. Apart from their preferences, political 
parties may differ in their abilities to achieve conomic goals. Favourable economic 
outcomes may indicate that the incumbent party is particularly able to deal with 
current economic problems. 
In this paper, we examine a voter model for the US which is interconnected 
with the partisan theory. Political parties differ in their preferences over unemploy- 
ment and inflation as in Alesina (1987). The working of the economy isdescribed by 
a simple unemployment equation due to Blanchard and Summers (1986) which 
relates unemployment to lagged unemployment and the difference between ex- 
pected and realised inflation. Policy makers may try to reduce unemployment by 
generating inflation surprises. With respect to economic outcomes, our model has 
the same implications as does the model of Alesina (1987). Unemployment tends to 
decline during democratic administrations and to increase during republican 
administrations. In contrast to the Alesina model, these ffects are partially lasting 
due to the lagged unemployment term in the unemployment equation. Swank and 
Hebbink (1992) show that the predictions of this model are consistent with 
post-war US data. in our model, voters are rational and forward-looking. They are 
perfectly informed about the preferences of political parties and about he state of 
the economy which changes over time due to lagged effects in the economy. Voters 
cast their ballots for the party that, if elected, will maximise their utility. The 
predictions of the voter model differ from the predictions of the conventional 
retrospective oter model. We show that the democratic party benefits from high 
unemployment and suffers from high inflation. It appears that voters use their 
votes to choose the party that best fits the economic situation. 
This paper builds on recent studies by Alesina (1988), Chappell and Keech 
(1989) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988). In these studies, voters are assumed to know 
and understand the economic onstraints policy makers face. In this respect, his 
study deviates from the earlier literature on voter behaviour (Kramer 1971; Fair 
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1978), in which voters just punish administrations for poor economic performance, 
without understanding the relationships between variables. Furthermore, this 
paper deviates from the existing literature in that it emphasizes the effects of 
partisan motives on voter behaviour. In the existing literature, voters punish 
administrations for undesirable conomic outcomes. In this paper a voter model 
is discussed in which undesirable outcomes may increase the popularity of the 
administration i office. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the economic problems 
facing policy makers are described. We show how electoral uncertainty and lagged 
effects in the economy affect the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 
Shifts of the Phillips curve play an important role in Sect. 3, where we examine two 
voter models, the retrospective voter model and the partisan voter model, and 
show how these models are related to the government model discussed in Sect. 2. In 
Sect. 4, we present some simple regressions of approval rates for American presi- 
dents, indicating that the predictions of both voter models are consistent with the 
data. 
2. A small economic model 
In this section, we consider a simple model of the labour market, due to Blanchard 
and Summers (1986) and a politico-economic model, due to Alesina (1987). From 
the Blanchard-Summers model, an unemployment equation will be derived that 
relates unemployment to unemployment last period and the difference between 
realised and expected inflation. In the politico-economic model the behaviour of 
the private sector will be described by this equation. 
As in earlier politico-economic models, the outcomes of our model heavily rely 
on the assumptions about he timing of policy relative to private actions. At the end 
of each period, nominal wage contracts are signed which last one period. These 
contracts are assumed to be non-contingent on the state of the world. Thus 
short-run nominal rigidities exist and the policy maker is able to create inflation 
surprises. Following Alesina (1987), we distinguish electoral and non-electoral 
periods. Elections are held at the beginning of each electoral period. Immediately 
after the elections, the winning party takes office. In a partisan framework, elections 
create uncertainty about future policies. The economy is assumed to be composed 
of small separate markets, so that firms and (firm specific) unions ignore the effects 
of their actions on economic policy and election outcomes. This implies that 
election outcomes are exogenous from the private agents' point of view. The 
probability distribution of election outcomes i assumed to be known: party d is 
elected with probability rc and party r with probability (1 - ~).1 In post-electoral 
periods, the identity of the policy maker is known and so no uncertainty exists 
about future policies. 
To facilitate the analysis we will make some simplifying assumptions. First, we 
assume that all agents care only about current  economic outcomes. Put differently, 
we restrict he analysis to a one-shot game. Admittedly, this assumption reduces 
the scope of this paper, since it prevents us from analyzing important issues, such as 
reputation and signalling. Second, following Hibbs (1977), Alesina (1987) and 
1 Election outcomes may be treated as exogenous if the identity of the decisive voter is 
unknown. 
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Swank (1992), we assume that political parties only aim at achieving economic 
goals. We ignore electoral policy as a means to partisan policy (Wittman, 1977 and 
1983) as well as partisan policy as a means to electoral policy. Third, policy makers 
are not able to commit policy in advance. 
2.1 The Phillips curve 
The economy is described by a simple model of the labour market. Each firm 
operates in a separate labour market (i) and hires labour up to the point where the 
real wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labour: 
Ii = + (1" (wl - pl) + (1) 
where l I, wl and Pl are the logs (subscript l) of employment, the nominal wage and 
production price in market i, respectively, e i is a disturbance term with mean zero. 
Following Blanchard and Fisher (1990), we assume that wages are set by (firm 
specific) unions, so as to meet an employment target l~ '~ which is assumed to be 
a weighted average of employment last period (denoted by subscript - 1) and the 
(fixed) labour force in market i, If i. 
l *i = col'If_, + (1 - o9i)" l~ i, (0 < o9i < 1), (2) 
where coi is the weight union i gives to the interests of its members. Wages are set 
before Pl and e i are observed. Hence 
wl = E_ lPl + (o),. If_, + (1 - o9,). l~')/(a - al/(1, (3) 
where E_ 1 is the expectation operator. Employment results from substituting (3) 
into (1), yielding 
Ii = (1 "(E-xpl  - Pl) + o9, "It_, + (1 - o9,). If i + e'. (4) 
Finally, by imposing symmetry (which implies that all unions choose the same 
wage and all firms hire the same number of workers), subtracting both sides of (4) 
by l~ and taking u ~ l~ - II, we obtain the unemployment equation: 
u = o~'u_ 1 + ( I " (P~-  E - lP l ) - -e  
= o9"u-1 + ( I " (P -  E - lP ) - -e ,  (5) 
where p( ,~ Pl - Pt_,) is the inflation rate. Eq. (5) describes unemployment as a lin- 
ear function of lagged unemployment and the difference between realised and 
expected inflation. The dynamics of unemployment should be associated with the 
weight unions give to their members. 
2.2 The policy maker 
Policy makers' preferences are described by a quadratic loss function in terms of 
unemployment and inflation. 
~i = ½.a.{p2 + j . .u  2} + (1 - a ) ' (p -  pc) 2, (6) 
where 2i denotes the weight government i attributes to reducing unemployment. 
The last term of (6) represents adjustment costs and is discussed below. In this 
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paper, we examine a two-party system. The (fixed) political positions of the two 
parties, party d and r, are represented by 2d and 2r, respectively. Both parties 
differ in their preferences over economic goals. From now on, we assume that party 
d attributes a higher or equal weight to reducing unemployment than party r, 
2d > 2,. TO evade straightforward algebra, we keep the description of the policy 
problem as simply as possible. For this reason, we assume that governments set 
prices directly. However, in our model policy makers cannot adjust prices costlessly. 
More specifically, we assume that the policy maker attaches costs, a, to deviations 
of the inflation rate from the inflation rate prevailing in the absence of policy 
intervention, Pc. The weight ct expresses the costs of inflation adjustment relative to 
partisan goals, a is assumed to be equal for party d and r. Note that the existence of 
adjustment costs is not explained by the model, but that adjustment costs are 
simply assumed. This assumPtion can be justified in at least wo ways. First, policy 
makers may be reluctant o intervene strongly, because they are uncertain about 
the effects of inflation on unemployment. Brainard (1967) shows that multiplicative 
uncertainty usually leads to a conservative use of instruments ( ee also Gordon 
1976; Ghosh and Masson 1991). Swank and Hebbink (1992) report empirical 
research indicating that multiplicative uncertainty has indeed played a significant 
role in past US economic policy, z Second, so far, we have treated the government 
as a decision maker whose goals are directly related to the goals of the governing 
party. This approach requires that the governing party completely controls the 
apparatus of the state. The possibility that this requirement is not met cannot be 
ruled out. Nowadays, bureaucrats are rarely viewed as persons who carry out 
policies unquestioningly. Moreover, the current sizes of most governments make 
complete control by politicians virtually impossible. At least, managing the appa- 
ratus of the state so that desired policy is carried out involves big efforts and time. 
The introduction of adjustment costs into the decision problem facing governments 
may be regarded as a crude way to account for these "administrative" costs. 
The policy problem the incumbent party faces is to minimise the expected loss 
function (6), subject o (5), yielding 
(1 - ot)" Pc - ot" ).i '~s "(co'u_1 - ~1 " E - lp )  
Pi = 1 + a '2 i '~  2 (7) 
Eq. (7) describes the optimal strategy of the policy maker, given the strategy of the 
wage setters (represented by E_ I P). 
2.3 The economic  constra ints  
Now that we have considered the optimisation problems, facing wage setters and 
the incumbent party, we can proceed with determining the equilibrium of the 
model. The equilibrium of the model is defined by the usual Nash conditions that 
both players select an optimal strategy, given the strategy of the opponent. In 
a partisan framework, there is a difference between the equilibria of the model in 
electoral and non-electoral periods. 
2 If a is due to multiplicative uncertainty, the assumption that at is equal for party d and r is 
rather estrictive. Relaxing this assumption, however, will not affect he results derived later 
essentially. 
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In non-electoral periods, the political colour of the policy makers is known. 
Then the equilibrium of the model follows from Pi = E_ 1P. Thus (see Eq. (7)) 
E- lp  = (1 - -  ~)'Pc - ~'2~'~1 "co" u-1. (8) 
The voter models to be discussed in the next section revolve around the trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. The constraint facing political parties in 
non-electoral periods, results from substituting (8) into (5): 
u = ~Yl "P + (co + a'2i" (~" o9)" u-1 - ~1 "(1 - a)'pc 
= ~1 "P + ~, i ,  (9) 
where ~,~ represents the part of the constraint facing the policy maker which is 
independent of(current) economic policy, p. Superscript n denotes that ~3,~ refers to 
non-electoral periods. ~.~ depends positively on unemployment last period and the 
inflation rate prevailing in the absence of policy intervention. From (9) it is easy to 
n n see that if 2d > /.,, then ~2,d > (2,r. 
Consider now electoral periods. Nominal wages are set before elections are 
held. Thus uncertainty exists about future policies. In equilibrium, inflation fore- 
casts must be rational: 
E-  lP = rt" E -  iPa + (1 - n)" E_ lP~, (10) 
where E_ tpa(E-~p,) is the expected inflation rate under party d (r) and n is the 
probability that party d is elected. Substituting (10) into (5) leads to the following 
economic onstraint: 
u = w 'u - i  + ~ l ' (P - -n 'E - lpa - (1  - n) 'E- lp~).  (11) 
To write (11) as a function of p, u_~ and Pc, we must solve (10) and substitute the 
result into (11). Using (10) and (7) we obtain after tedious, but straightforward, 
algebra: 
u = ~l'P + ~/l'u-1 + r/z'pc 
= ff~ .p + ff~, (12) 
where 
[=.(1 + a'),,'g~)'),a + (1 - n)'(1 + o~'2a'~2)'2/l'ot'~t2"co 
ni = ~ + (1 + o~.).~. ~) . (1  + a.~. , -C~)-  [~-(1 + a .~. , .~) .~ + (t - ~1 + a.).~. ~).,L-I .a.~'~ 
and 
- ~,. [r:.(1 + ¢¢'2/~) + (1 - tO'(1 + ¢¢'2a'~,a)] '(1- ~) 
and superscript e denotes that (~ refers to electoral periods. From (7) it is easy to 
see that if ).d > 2r then Pd> Pr. As a consequence, in equilibrium we have E_ lPa > 
E_ lP > E_ lP,. Furthermore, it is straightforward to derive that given u_ ~ and Pc, 
(~,n > ~ and (~.r < (~. The intuition behind these results is clear. In our model, 
party d is more inclined to create inflation surprises than party r. In non-electoral 
periods, private agents know the identity of the governing party and respond to its 
incentives to create inflation surprises. Due to this, inflation expectations depend 
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on the identity of the governing party, implying (~,a > ~,r. In electoral years, 
private agents do not know the identity of the governing party. Inflation expecta- 
tions are therefore somewhere between the expected inflation under party d and r. 
Let us now briefly consider the predictions of this model for unemployment and 
inflation which follow from minimising (6), subject o (9) for non-electoral periods 
and (12) for electoral periods. As in Alesina (1987), uncertainty about future policies 
leads to inflation surprises in electoral periods. Inflation is higher under party 
d than under party r and consequently unemployment is lower under party d than 
under party r. In non-electoral periods, private agents anticipate upon policy 
makers' incentives to create inflation surprises. As a result, in non-electoral periods 
unemployment depends only on past unemployment and the disturbance term, 
even though inflation is higher under party d than under party r. 
In this section, we have examined a partisan model of economic policy. We 
have shown that the trade-off between unemployment and inflation changes over 
time, due to electoral uncertainty and lagged economic effects. Swank and Hebbink 
(1992) show that the predictions of this model are consistent with post-war US 
data. In the next section, we examine how rational voters make their vote decisions 
in such an environment. 
3. The score and issue model of voter behaviour 
Since Downs' (1957) seminal work, voter behaviour has often been analyzed in 
a rational choice framework. In a rational choice setting, avoter casts his ballot for 
the party which, if elected, will offer him the highest expected utility. Like the 
preferences of political parties, voters' preferences are described by a quadratic 
function: 
Vv(p, u) = - ½. {p2 + ;.v" u ~} (13) 
where ,~.v is the weight voter v attributes to unemployment. Voter v will cast his 
ballot for party d rather than for party r if 
z - =~'{(Pr  -P2)  + ) . . (u  2 _ u2)} > 0, (14) 
where V ~, Pi and u~ are the expected values of V~, p and u, respectively when party 
i is the incumbent party. 
Now the question arises how do voters determine the expected values of 
unemployment and inflation under different political parties? In answering this 
question, two voter models can be distinguished, the score model and the issue 
model. The issue model, having its roots in the partisan theory, ascribes differences 
in expected economic outcomes to differences in the objective functions of political 
parties. In the score model there is agreement between political parties and voters 
over the economic goals. Instead, the score model highlights differences in the 
competence of political parties. In Sect. 3.1 and 3.2 we examine the relationships 
between economic outcomes and the popularity of political parties in the score and 
issue model, respectively. 
3.1 The score model 
In the score model voters do not see "ideological" differences between political 
parties. This implies that the policy weight in the loss function of the policy model 
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(Eq. (6)) is independent of the political colour of the government (2; = 2g for all 
types of governments i) a Since the preferences of political parties do not differ, no 
uncertainty exists about future economic policy. As a consequence, Eq. (9) repres- 
ents the economic onstraint facing governments in electoral periods as well as in 
non-electoral periods. For this reason, we may drop the superscript n. 
In the score model expected economic outcomes differ under different political 
parties because some parties are better able to achieve conomic goals than other 
parties. Thus political parties differ in their abilities to achieve conomic goals. The 
competence of political parties may be reflected by ~2,i in (9) (see Persson and 
Tabellini 1990). For example, a competent political party may be particularly able 
to negotiate with unions, so that unions attribute high weight to the interests of 
non-members. This would imply a low co in Eq. (5) and a low (2,t accordingly. 
From (6) and (9), it is easy to derive that a more competent government, facing 
a relative low value of (2.~, can achieve lower unemployment with less inflation. 
Let us now examine the decision problem facing voters. The above indicates 
that in the score model, political parties can be distinguished by their competence, 
i.e. (2,~. If voters were assumed to have perfect information, they would simply 
make their vote decisions on the basis of ~2,~, since if ~2,a < ~2,r, then V~ > V'~ (see 
Eq. (14)). 4 Due to this, we can formalise vote decisions in terms of (2,~. A voter will 
cast his ballot for party d if party d is expected to be more competent than party r: 
la ..... = ~2 . . . . .  - ~2,at . l  > 0. (15)  
Usually it is assumed that voters do not directly observe the competence of 
different policy makers (see e.g. Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Persson and Tabellini 
1990). Instead, voters draw information about the competence of political parties 
from past economic outcomes. Competence is assumed to be partially lasting. Thus 
a political party that was able to deal with economic problems in the past is 
expected to be able to deal with economic problems tomorrow. Because the 
environment in which political parties operate slowly changes, it is natural to 
assume that the abilities of political parties in the recent past carry more weight 
than the abilities of political parties in the long past. This can be formalised by 
assuming that the expected competence of a political party follows a geometric lag 
distribution (cf. Fiorina 1981, p 75): 
(2,1.~ = f12" ~ fl~'~2,it-~ with 0 < fll < 1 f12 > O, (16) 
j=O 
where t is a time index and ~2,~,_j reflects the abilities of political party i to deal with 
economic problems at time t - j .  Substitution of (16) into (15) for both party d and 
r leads to 
la . . . . .  = fll "la.,~ + f12" ['~2,rt --  ~2,dt]" (17) 
There remains the determination of (2,a, and ~2.,~. Suppose that in period 
t party d is the incumbent party and that party r is the opposition party. As to the 
a This assumption may be the result of a two-party system in which the ultimate goal of 
political parties is mobilising votes (Mueller 1989, p. 278). 
4 Note that differences in ~.~ are not due to differences in the policy weights of political 
parties. 
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determination of (2,d,, voters can use current economic outcomes. Voters are 
assumed to have imperfect information, in the sense that they are not able to 
discern random changes in economic outcomes from changes in economic out- 
comes, resulting from shifts in the competence ofthe incumbent party. (2,d, can be 
derived from the government model by using (9): 
(2,d~ = u, - (1 "P,. (18) 
Of course, economic outcomes do not provide information about the competence 
of the opposition party. Usually, it is assumed that if party r were in office, 
(2.r, would take its "normal", fixed value, say ~'2: 
(2,,, = C2. (19) 
Together Eqs. (16) and (19) imply that in the voters' view, the opposition party 
gradually develops into a party with a "normal record". Substituting (18) and (19) 
into (17) yields 
ld., = ill" la ..... -- f12 .u, + f12" (1 "P, + f12" C2. (20) 
Eq. (25) has served as a starting point for numerous empirical analyses. Sometimes 
other economic variables were included, in particular growth in national income, 
but the main hypothesis behind the score model had long been maintained: 
favourable conomic outcomes improve the record of the incumbent party and its 
popularity accordingly. Considerable vidence xists supporting this hypothesis. 
For several countries, negative effects of unemployment and inflation on the 
government's or the president's popularity have been found (for a survey, see 
Mueller 1989). 
3.2 The issue model 
In this section, we examine the main properties of the issue model. In the issue 
model, political parties do not differ in their abilities to achieve conomic goals, but 
differ in their preferences over economic goals. In the policy model discussed in the 
previous ection, this implies that political parties attach different costs to unem- 
ployment (2d > 2r in (6)). Now let us see, how in the partisan framework, utility 
maximising voters make their vote decisions. 
Vote decisions are made at the beginning of each period, thus after nominal 
wages are set. As a consequence, voters take as given the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation. In the remaining part of this section, we will simply 
describe the economic onstraint facing political parties by 
u = (1 'P + (2, (21) 
but the reader should remember that (2 changes over time as expressed by (9) 
and (12). Given (21), party d is associated with low unemployment and party r is 
associated with low inflation. In making their vote decisions, voters have to 
determine whether they are prepared to accept a higher inflation rate for a lower 
unemployment rate. This is formalised by (14), from which the following property 
of the issue model can be derived. 
Property I: Every voter votes for the party closest to his most preferred position in 
terms of p. 
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Proof: First, define Pv as the inflation rate most preferred by voter v. pv results from 
maximising (13) with respect o p, subject to (21). By substituting (21) into (13) 
we get 
Vv(p) = - ½"(1 + 2v.~).p2 _ 2 , . (1 . (2 .P -½.2~.~,  (22) 
where V,(p,) is the absolute maximum. Eq. (22) evaluates alternative policies in 
terms ofp. Let us now return to Property I. We can split Property I into two parts: 
Property Ia: If Pn - P, > P~ - P,, voter v votes for party r. 
Property Ib: If Pa - P, < Pv - P,, voter v votes for party d. 
We can confine ourselves to proving Property Ia as the proof of Property Ib is 
symmetric. First, consider a situation where Pv < P, < Pa. Eq. (22) shows that for 
p > pv, Vv(.) is a strictly decreasing function. Hence if p~ < Pr < Pa, then V,(p,) > 
Vv(pd), so that voter v will vote for party r. Now consider a situation where 
P, < P, < Pn- Since V,(p) is a symmetric function with an extremum at p~, we know 
that V~(p~ + Pi) = V~(p, - Pi). Hence, 
V~(p,) = V~(po - (p~ - p,)) = V~(p~ + pv - p,). (23) 
The condition of Property Ia implies that p, + pv - p, < Pa. Since (p~ - p,) > 0 
and V,(p) is a strictly decreasing function for p > p,, we have 
V~(p,) = V,(p~ + p~ - p,) > Vv(pn). (24) 
Thus voter v votes for party r. [] 
Property I indicates that the issue model and the demand-side of the well-known 
Hotelling-Downs model are closely related. In the Hotelling-Downs model, polit- 
ical preferences are depicted as lying along a left-right dimension and each voter is 
assumed to vote for the party closest o his most preferred position. 
Let us now examine the relationship between the economic system and vote 
decisions. In the issue model, both voters and political parties take as given the 
working of the economy, represented by (21). However, Sect. 2 shows that in the 
policy model (2 changes over time. It is thus of interest o examine the effects of 
a rise in ~2 on vote decisions. 
Property II: I f  the distribution of voters' preferences can be represented by a positive 
valued function, a rise in ~2 increases the number of votes cast for party d. 
Proof: The condition of Property II implies that there is at least one voter, let us 
say voter m, who is indifferent between party d and party r. For this voter, V~(. ) - 
V~,(.) = 0 holds (see Eq. (14)). Hence, 
½. - + - = o .  (25)  
Substituting (21) into (25) gives 
2,.'{¢~'(p~ -- p~) + 2"¢1 ¢2"(P,-- Pd)} = PJ - P~. (26) 
Now define the function: 
p2 _ p2 (27) 
2,.(P,~, P,, P~ , (2) = 2 2 ( I " (P ,  - p2) + 2 . ( l (2 . (p , -pe)  
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2m(') describes the preference of the voter who is indifferent o party d and party 
r as a function of Pi, Pc and (z. Thus (27) identifies the voter being indifferent o 
party d and r in terms of Pi, Pc and (z. Henceforth we will refer to this function as 
the IVF (Indifferent Voter Function). From Property I it is easy to see that every 
voter who attributes a higher (lower) weight to unemployment than voter m, votes 
for party d (party r). This implies that, the higher 2m(" ), the more votes party r gets. 
Obviously, this a very useful property of this function, since it enables us to 
determine conomic influences on election outcomes by examining the properties 
of 2,,(.). To prove Property II we have to show that 02m/~(2 < O. 
First note that 2,,(") can be simplified by dividing the numerator and denom- 
inator of (27) by (Pal -- P~), leading to 
Pd + P, (28) 
2r,(Pa, P~,P~,(2) = _ (2 . (p ,  + Pa) - 2"(a '(2" 
Next, define 
= - (p ,  + - 2 .  (1 "(2 = ½" (u  - - p , )  > o.  
Differentiating (28) with respect to (2, using p~=[(1 -oO'pc -a '2~' (x ' (2 ] /  
[1 + a" 2i" (12] gives after some rearrangements: 
2"(1{  /82 t?(----~ = -1 +¢t.(2.2d + 1 +0t . (2 .2 , j /  <0.  [] (29) 
Before dwelling on the intuition behind Property II, let us first analyze a third 
property of the issue model. Suppose that after nominal wages are set, p, rises. How 
does this affect the popularity of political parties? 
Property III: An unanticipated increase in the inflation rate prevailing in the absence 
of policy actions, Pc, increases the number of votes cast for party r. 
Proof: To prove Property VI we have to show that O2r,(')/ap~ > O. 
ap--'-~ = +-cx--(~-~. 2d+ 1 q~ ~-7~-2, B2 > 0. [] (30) 
The intuition behind Properties I and II is straightforward. The key idea behind the 
issue model is that different parties are better in different issues. A rise in (2 makes 
unemployment a more manifest problem. Since party d is expected to be better in 
reducing unemployment than party r, party d benefits from a rise in (2. In contrast, 
an unanticipated rise in Pc aggravates the inflation problem. Due to this, party 
r which assigns a high priority to fighting inflation, benefits from a rise in p~. 
From (9) and (12), we know that a rise in unemployment and p~ increases (2. 
Thus high unemployment increases the popularity of party d. The effects of an 
anticipated rise in Pc on the popularity of political parties are ambiguous. On the 
one hand, a rise in Pc increases the popularity of party r through (30), but on the 
other hand it increases the popularity of party d through (9) and (12). In the next 
section, we will associate the inflation rate, prevailing in the absence of policy, Pc, 
with the lagged inflation rate. 
In the issue model, the effects of economic conditions on the popularity of 
political parties are independent of which party is in office. In this respect, the issue 
model deviates from the score model, according to which the incumbent (opposi- 
tion) party benefits (suffers) from favourable conomic outcomes, irrespective of its 
political colour. 
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4. Preliminary evidence 
In the previous ection, we have seen that the score and issue model have different 
empirical implications. Roughly, the issue model predicts that the popularity of the 
republican (democratic) party increases (decreases) when unemployment declines. 
The effects of inflation on popularity are ambitious, but have different directions 
for democratic and republican administrations. On the other hand, the score model 
predicts that the incumbent party, regardless of its political colour, benefits from 
low inflation and low unemployment. This section reports ome simple regressions 
of approval rates for American presidents hat indicate that the predictions of both 
models are consistent with the data. 
Before dwelling on the estimation results, a few remarks are in order. First, the 
estimates are based on data of presidential popularity ratings from the well-known 
Gallop Polls rather than on votes, because of the large number of observations 
which makes discrimination between the two voter models less difficult. The 
popularity series offers sufficient data to evaluate the models' predictions accurately. 
It is without saying that approval rates are not equivalent to election outcomes, 
even though earlier esearch suggests that both are closely related (Fiorina, 1981). 
Nevertheless, we assume that the approval rates correspond to voters' party 
preferences. In the Appendix estimates are reported on the basis of data on 
presidential elections for the period 1904-1988. In essence, these estimates are in 
line with the estimates presented below. Second, we confine ourselves to estimating 
simple linear regressions. However, the issue model suggests that the relationships 
between economic and election outcomes are more complicated. Thus the regres- 
sions can only be regarded as crude approximations of the issue model's predic- 
tions. Third, apart from economic variables, the regressions include three political 
dummy variables. A dummy variable for the Vietnam war, war, is included to 
reflect he dissatisfaction of the electorate with the involvement of the US in the 
Vietnam war. In addition, the equations to be estimated include a dummy variable 
for the Watergate period, water. Finally, a dummy variable, dumdem, is added, 
taking the value 1 when a democratic president is in office and is 0 otherwise. In the 
estimated equations, the dummy variables have the right signs and are generally 
significant at conventional significant levels. 
Following McFadden (1974), we make use of a simple logit model. The 
difference between the logarithms of the proportion of approval for the democratic 
party (prop(d)) and the republican party (prop(r)) serves as the dependent variable, 
lpop = log[prop(d) /prop(r ) ] .  Since the resultant model is heteroscedastic, the 
equations are estimated with generalised least squares. The estimation results are 
presented in Table 1. 
The first column of Table 1 shows that the main properties of the score model 
are consistent with the data. The variables u and sp refer to Unemployment and 
inflation, respectively. Their values are positive under a democratic administration 
and negative under a republican administration (for example, su = dumdem'u - 
(1 - dumdem), u). As anticipated, the estimates for su and sp are both negative, 
indicating that theincumbent party suffers from unemployment and inflation. 
The second column of Table 1 reveals that the main predictions of the issue 
model are also consistent with the data, although the standard errors for u and 
p are rather high. The estimates suggest hat the democratic party benefits from 
unemployment while the republican party benefits from inflation. Together, the 
estimates presented in the first two columns of Table 1 suggest that the data cannot 
forcefully discriminate between the score and issue model. In our opinion, this is 
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Table 1. Estimates ofpopularity functions for the United States, 1964.1-1986.4 
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Score model Issue model Score/issue model 
lpop_ 1 0.549 (0.069)** 0.716 (0.059)** 0.430 (0.069)** 
su - 0.047 (0.018)** - -  0.017 (0.056) 
sp -- 0.048 (0.012)** - -  -- 0.081 (0.014)** 
u - -  0.034 (0.019)* 0.084 (0.031)** 
/7 - -  - 0.021 (0.011)* - 0.052 (0.012)** 
war -- 0.463 (0.117)** - 0.109 (0.109) - 0.352 (0.161)** 
water 0.576 (0.114)** 0.598 (0.127)** 0.739 (0.111)** 
dumdem 1.356 (0.308)** 0.146 (0.069)** 1.041 (0.369)** 
constant - 0.691 (0.158)** - 0.189 (0.136) - 0.726 (0.150)** 
R 2 0.815 0.782 0.850 
Q(10) 10.873 6.061 7.472 
h 0.262 0.091 0.298 
F(2, 83) 9.722 18.889 - -  
Notes: All equations are estimated with generalised least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates ignificant at a 0.10 level and ** indicates ignificant at a 0.05 level. R 2 is the coefficient of 
determination, Q(10) is the Q-statistic of Box and Pierce for 10 autocorrelations and h is Durbin's h. 
F(2, 83) is used to test the restrictions implied by the score and issue model, For both models the two 
restrictions are soundly rejected. Source: Ipop, Gallop; u and p, OECD 
not a serious problem, since both models need not to exclude ach other. For why 
should voters ignore the records of political parties in a partisan world? 
In the third column of Table I, the estimates of an unconstrained popularity 
function are presented. The estimates once again fail to show the superiority of one 
of the two models. All coefficients appear to be significant at fairly high statistical 
levels, except for su.  Apparently, the score and issue model can coexist. All in all, 
our findings sketch a nice picture of the American voter. In evaluating political 
parties, the American voter considers partisan policies and, in addition, punishes 
(rewards) the incumbent for poor (good) economic performance. 
4. Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper has been to examine a voter model based on the 
partisan theory. First, we have presented a policy model in which two political 
parties differ in their preferences over unemployment and inflation. We have 
demonstrated that this model eads to cycles in economic variables, due to electoral 
uncertainty. In contrast o Alesina (1987), partisan effects on economic variables 
are partially lasting due to lagged economic effects. 
Next, we have examined how voters make their vote decisions in this partisan 
setting. We have shown that vote decisions depend on the policy problems, facing 
political parties. Voters appear to pick the party that best fits the current economic 
problems. As a result, the political party that ascribes a high priority to reducing 
unemployment (inflation) benefits from unemployment (inflation). These results 
conflict with the predictions of conventional voter models, according to which the 
incumbent party benefits from low unemployment and low inflation, irrespective of
its political colour. 
Estimates of approval rates for American presidents provide support for both 
the partisan voter model and the conventional voter model. Apparently, the 
American voter takes partisan effects on economic variables into consideration as 
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Table 2. Estimates of vote functions for the United States, 1904-1988 
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Score model Issue model Score/issue model 
su 0.001 (0.010) --  
sp - 0.047 (0.013)* --  
u --  0.034 (0.009)** 0.029 (0.009)** 
p - -  - 0.022 (0.011)* - 0.024 (0.011)** 
M - 0.0t2 (0.006)* 
dumdem 0.651 (0.177)** 0.295 (0.094)** 0.572 (0.174)** 
constant - 0.346 (0.093)** - 0.348 (0.091) - 0.431 (0.098)** 
R 2 0.525 0.530 0.601 
DW 2.250 2.294 2.313 
Notes: All equations are estimated with generalised least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates significant at a 0.10 level and ** indicates significant a  a 0.05 level. R 2 is the coefficient of
determination. Source: Fair (1978) OECD and Statistical Abstract of the United States 
well as the overall record of political parties. More generally, our findings indicate 
the need for a voter model that integrates the main elements of the score and issue 
model. Other points on the research agenda re the extension of our "static" model 
to a multi-period model and the examination of models in which political party 
may aim at both electoral and partisan goals. 
Appendix 
Table 2 reports estimates of vote functions based on data of presidential elections. 
As dependent variable serves log(popp/(1 - popp), where popp is the democratic 
percentage of the two-party votes for the presidential elections between 1904-1988. 
The independent variables are based on inflation and unemPloyment rates in the 
year of election. As in Sect. 4, we have added a dummy variable, taking the value 
1 when a democratic president was in power before the elections and taking the 
value zero otherwise. The lagged dependent variable is dropped from the equation, 
as it appeared insignificant at conventional levels of significance. 
The first column of Table 2 shows the estimates of a vote function based on the 
score model. These estimates indicate that voters punish administrations for high 
inflation, but not for high unemployment. These results conflict with column 1 in 
Table 1, but are in line with the estimation results of the integrated voter model. 
The second column of Table 2 indicates that the data on presidential elections is 
consistent with the issue model. Unemployment increases the number of votes for 
the democratic andidate, while inflation increases the number of votes for the 
republican candidate. In the third column of Table 2 the estimates of a vote 
function are presented in which the score and issue model are integrated. We 
started with estimating a vote function in which no restrictions were imposed on 
the parameters of the model. In this case the score model was rejected and the 
estimates were similar to the estimates presented in column 2. Next, we define 
a misery index, M, as the sum of su and sp and replace su and sp by M. In line with 
the score model, we expect hat voters punish administrations for high values of M. 
The estimates of the resulting vote function are presented in the third column of 
Table 2 and are more or less consistent with the estimates reported in Table 1. We 
may conclude that the estimates on the basis of data on presidential elections are 
broadly in line with the estimates on the basis of popularity data. However, we 
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would like to emphasize that estimates presented in Table 2 should be considered 
with great care, since it is based on a very small number of observations. 
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